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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game
theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical
game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of deterministic
dynamical systems motivated by evolutionary game theory, including ordinary diﬀerential
equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), diﬀerential inclusions (the best
response dynamics), diﬀerence equations (as, for instance, ﬁctitious play) and reaction-
diﬀusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called ‘folk theorem of evolutionary game
theory’) is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium,
but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always
account for the long-term behaviour of players adjusting their behaviour to maximise their
payoﬀ.
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Evolutionary Game Dynamics
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1 Introduction
According to the eminent biologist Ernst Mayr, the greatest conceptual revolution that
has taken place in biology was the replacement of typological thinking by population
thinking [Mayr70]. A similar conceptual revolution has occurred in game theory. It was
fostered, appropriately, by evolutionary biologists such as William D. Hamilton and John
Maynard Smith. The resulting population-based, ‘evolutionary’ game theory has found
many applications in non-biological ﬁelds like economics or learning theory and presents
an important enrichment of ‘classical’ game theory, which is centered on the concept of a
rational individual.
This survey focuses on the mathematical core of evolutionary game theory and concen-
trates on deterministic evolutionary game dynamics, a dynamics which describes how the
frequencies of strategies within a population change in time, according to the strategies’
success. This requires certain modiﬁcations in the basic conceptual approach. At the
risk of over-simpliﬁcation, one can say that classical game theory deals with a rational
individual, or ‘player’, who is engaged in a given interaction or ‘game’ with other players
and has to decide between diﬀerent options, or ‘strategies’, in order to maximise a ‘payoﬀ’
which depends on the strategies of the co-players (who, in turn, attempt to maximise their
payoﬀ). In contrast, evolutionary game theory deals with entire populations of players, all
programmed to use some strategy (or type of behaviour). Strategies with high payoﬀ will
spread within the population (this can be achieved by learning, by copying or inheriting
strategies, or even by infection). The payoﬀs depend on the actions of the co-players and
hence on the frequencies of the strategies within the population. Since these frequencies
change according to the payoﬀs, this yields a feedback loop. The dynamics of this feedback
loop is the object of evolutionary game theory.
This ansatz may well be what Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann had in
mind when, in the introduction of their classical treatise on game theory [NM47], they
underlined the desirability of a ‘dynamic’ approach to complement their ‘static’ solution
concept, and certainly John Nash had anticipated nothing else when (in an unpublished
section of his thesis [Na51]) he sketched a ‘mass action approach’ to his equilibrium notion
which, many years later, was re-discovered as the evolutionary approach (see [Le94], [Na96,
p.32], or [Na01]).
The feedback dynamics depend strongly, of course, on the population structure, on the
underlying game and on the way strategies spread. Thus there are many ‘game dynamics’,
which can be discrete or continuous, stochastic or deterministic. We shall divide this
expository survey into three parts. Section 2 deals with the ‘replicator dynamics’: it
starts with a ‘folk theorem’ connecting the dynamics with Nash equilibria, oﬀers some
results on a classiﬁcation of its long-term behaviour, discusses the notion of permanence
(where no strategy gets eliminated), and investigates the concept of an evolutionarily
1
stable equilibrium, before turning to bimatrix games. Section 3 deals with ‘other game
dynamics’: these include imitation dynamics, the best response dynamics, smoothed best
reply and the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. Among the recurrent questions are
whether variants of the ‘folk theorem’ remain valid, and whether dominated strategies get
eliminated. A central result on general ‘adjustment dynamics’ shows that every reasonable
adaptation process will fail, for some games, to lead to a Nash equilibrium. Section 4
deals with ‘extensions and applications’, including, for instance, discrete time dynamics,
or models based on diﬀusion in spatially distributed populations. This section covers
methods used in evolutionary biology, as e.g. population genetics and adaptive dynamics,
as well as approaches from classical, rationality-based game theory, as for instance the
technique of ﬁctitious play. We conclude by stressing the close links of evolutionary game
dynamics with Nash’s original proofs of his equilibrium theorem.
The emphasis on replicator dynamics in this survey is not meant to suggest that it
is as important as all other dynamics together, but it serves conveniently for expository
purposes and reﬂects some of the history of the subject. It is not possible to present
here a complete overview of the whole area of evolutionary games – for this, the format
of book-length treatments like [MS82], [HoS88], [BoP89], [Cr92], [We95], [V96], [Sa97],
[FL98], [HoSi98], [Y98], [Gi00] and [Cr03] is much more appropriate; what we attempt is
a signposted introduction aimed at mathematicians sensitive to the charms of new and
variegated deterministic dynamics arising out of simple, individual-based models of social
evolution. For previous surveys directed to biologists and economists, see [Hi87], [HaS94],
[Ka97], [Mai98], [Bo¨00]. For the connection of evolutionary game theory with classical
game theory, we refer to [We95] and [vD91] and for a very recent full-length treatment of
extensive form games, to [Cr03].
2 Replicator dynamics
2.1 Nash equilibria
The simplest type of game has only two players, I and II , each with a ﬁnite set of options
or pure strategies, Strat(I) resp. Strat(II). (The even simpler case of a one-player game
reduces to an optimisation problem.) We shall denote by aij resp. bij the payoﬀ (or, if
this is a random variable, its expected value) for player I resp. II when I uses strategy
i ∈ Strat(I) and II uses j ∈ Strat(II). Thus the payoﬀs are given by the n×m-matrices
A and B, with n and m as the cardinalities of the sets of pure strategies.
The mixed strategy of player I which consists in using i ∈ Strat(I) with probability
xi will be denoted by the (column) vector x = (x1, ..., xn)
T , which is an element of the
unit simplex Sn spanned by the vectors ei of the standard unit base: these vectors will
be identiﬁed with the elements of Strat(I). Similarly, the unit simplex Sm spanned by
the vectors fj corresponds to the set of mixed strategies for player II . If player I uses
x ∈ Sn and II uses y ∈ Sm, then the former has as his expected payoﬀ x
TAy and the
latter xTBy. The strategy x ∈ Sn is said to be a best reply to y ∈ Sm if
zTAy ≤ xTAy (1)
for all z ∈ Sn. The (compact, convex, non-empty) set of all best replies to y is denoted
by BR(y). A pair (x, y) ∈ Sn × Sm is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if x ∈ BR(y) and (with
an obvious abuse of notation) y ∈ BR(x). As we shall presently see, a simple ﬁxed-
point argument shows that such NE always exist. The pair is said to be a strict Nash
equilibrium if x is the unique best reply to y and vice versa. Necessarily, strict NE are
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of the form (ei, fj). If two strategies form a NE, none of the players has an incentive to
deviate unilaterally. In this sense, such an outcome satisﬁes a consistency condition.
In order to transfer this to a population setting, it is convenient to restrict attention,
to begin with, to the case where the two players I and II are interchangeable individuals
within the population, i.e. to consider only the case where the two players do not appear in
diﬀerent roles – as, for instance, buyer and seller – but have the same strategy set and the
same payoﬀ matrix. More precisely, we shall ﬁrst consider symmetric games, deﬁned by
Strat(I) = Strat(II) and A = BT . For symmetric games, players cannot be distinguished
and only symmetric pairs (x, x) of strategies are of interest. We shall therefore say, by
abuse of language, that strategy x ∈ Sn is a Nash equilibrium if
zTAx ≤ xTAx (2)
for all z ∈ Sn, i.e. if x is a best reply to itself. The equilibrium is said to be strict if
equality holds only for z = x.
2.2 The replicator equation
Let us consider now a population consisting of n types, and let xi be the frequency of
type i. Then the state of the population is given by x ∈ Sn. We shall now assume that
the xi are diﬀerentiable functions of time t (which requires assuming that the population
is inﬁnitely large or that the xi are expected values for an ensemble of populations) and
postulate a law of motion for x(t). If individuals meet randomly and then engage in a
symmetric game with payoﬀ matrix A, then (Ax)i is the expected payoﬀ for an individual
of type i and xTAx is the average payoﬀ in the population state x. Let us assume that
the per capita rate of growth, i.e. the logarithmic derivative (logxi)
. = x˙i/xi, is given by
the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ for type i and the average payoﬀ in the population. This
yields the replicator equation
x˙i = xi((Ax)i − x
TAx) (3)
for i = 1, ..., n. The replicator equation, which was introduced in [TaJ78] and baptised in
[ScS83], describes a selection process: more successful strategies spread in the population.
(This diﬀerential equation appeared earlier in diﬀerent contexts such as population genetics
and chemical networks, see e.g. [HoS88] or [HoSi98] for historical remarks.)
Since the hyperplanes
∑
xi = 1 and xi = 0 are invariant, it follows that the unit
simplex Sn is invariant, and from now on we shall consider only the restriction of (3) to
Sn, the state space of the population. The boundary faces
Sn(J) = {x ∈ Sn : xi = 0 for all i ∈ J} (4)
(where J is any non-trivial subset of {1, ..., n}) are also invariant under (3), and so is
the interior, intSn, of the state space, where xi > 0 for all i. Two simple facts will be
frequently used:
(a) adding a constant cj to all entries in the j-th column of A does not aﬀect the
replicator equation;
(b) whenever the power product P =
∏
i x
αi
i is deﬁned, its time-derivative satisﬁes
P˙ = P
∑
αi[(Ax)i − x
TAx]. (5)
In order to describe the long-term behaviour of the dynamics, we shall say that a rest
point z is stable if for every neighborhood U of z there exists a neighborhood V of z such
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that x ∈ V implies x(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0. The rest point z is said to be attracting if it has
a neighborhood U such that x(t)→ z for t→ +∞ holds for all x ∈ U . It is asymptotically
stable (or an attractor) if it is both stable and attracting, and globally stable if it is stable
and x(t) → z for t → +∞ whenever xi > 0 for all i with zi > 0. (One cannot request
convergence for all x ∈ Sn since boundary faces are invariant.) Similar deﬁnitions are used
if z is replaced by a closed set of rest points, or a compact invariant set.
2.3 Nash equilibria and the replicator equation
The rest points of the replicator equation, i.e. the zeros of the vector ﬁeld given by the
right hand side of (3), are the points x ∈ Sn satisfying (Ax)i = x
TAx for all i ∈ supp(x).
Thus a rest point in intSn (an interior rest point) is a solution of the system of linear
equations (Ax)1 = · · · = (Ax)n (generically, there exists at most one such solution), and
the rest points in the interior of each subface Sn(J) are obtained similarly. In particular,
the corners ei of the state simplex are always rest points.
There is a close relation between the rest points of the replicator equation and the
Nash equilibria given by the (symmetric) game with payoﬀ matrix A. Indeed, it is easy
to see (see, for instance, [Bo86], [Nac90], or [We95], [HoSi98]) that
(a) if z is a Nash equilibrium, then it is a rest point;
(b) if z is a strict Nash equilibrium, then it is asymptotically stable;
(c) if the rest point z is the limit of an interior orbit (an orbit x(t) in intSn) for
t→ +∞, then z is a Nash equilibrium; and
(d) if the rest point z is stable, then it is a Nash equilibrium.
This is sometimes referred to as the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory (cf.
[Cr03]). None of the converse statements holds. Trivially, every interior rest point is a
Nash equilibrium. At a boundary rest point z, the diﬀerence (Az)i−z
TAz is an eigenvalue
for the Jacobian of the replicator equation whose eigenvector is transversal to the face
zi = 0. Hence a rest point z is a Nash equilibrium iﬀ all its transversal eigenvalues are
nonpositive. This yields a proof for the existence of Nash equilibria in terms of population
dynamics:
Theorem 1 Each game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, the equation
x˙i = xi((Ax)i − x
TAx− nε) + ε (6)
is a perturbation of the replicator equation (3) with a small ε > 0 representing a constant
immigration term. This equation maintains the relation
∑
i x˙i = 0 on Sn and the ﬂow on
the boundary points into the interior of Sn. By a variant of Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem,
there exists at least one rest point z(ε) in intSn, and
(Az(ε))i − z(ε)
TAz(ε)− nε = −
ε
zi(ε)
< 0. (7)
Any accumulation point z of z(ε) (for ε→ 0) is an NE.
A simple modiﬁcation of this argument (see [HoS88], [HoSi98]) shows that if all NE
are regular (i.e., with non-singular Jacobian), then their number must be odd, as shown
earlier e.g. in [Har73].
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2.4 Classiﬁcation of phase portraits
We consider two replicator equations as equivalent if there exists a homeomorphism of
Sn mapping the (oriented) orbits of one equation onto those of the other. The task of
classifying the equivalence classes is solved only in low dimensions.
For n = 2 the replicator dynamics reduces (with x = x1 and 1−x = x2) to the equation
x˙ = x(1− x)((Ax)1 − (Ax)2) (8)
on [0, 1] which admits only three outcomes (apart from the trivial case that all points
are rest points): either there is no interior equilibrium, in which case one or the other
frequency converges to 0 (the corresponding strategy, or type, is said to be dominated by
the other), or else there exists an interior rest point. If this point is (globally) stable, it
is the only (symmetric) NE and the outcome is a stable coexistence of both types. If it is
unstable, the two pure strategies given by x = 0 and x = 1 are also Nash equilibria and
both are attracting, in which case one speaks of bistability.
For n = 3, the classiﬁcation of all phase portraits was achieved by Zeeman [Ze80]
(for the generic case) and by Bomze [Bo83], [Bo94]. A basic result is that there exist no
isolated periodic orbits and hence no limit cycles [Ho81]. (In non-generic cases families
of non-isolated periodic orbits can cover part or all of intS3.) There are 33 generic phase
portraits (or 19 up to ﬂow reversal). Of particular interest is the case of the rock-scissors-
paper game, where strategy 1 is dominated by 2 (in the absence of 3, i.e., if x3 = 0), and
similarly 2 is dominated by 3, and 3 is, in turn, dominated by 1. After normalising by
adding constants to the columns such that the diagonal terms are 0, the payoﬀ matrix is
in this case of the form
A =


0 −a2 b3
b1 0 −a3
−a1 b2 0

 (9)
with ai and bi positive. There exists a unique rest point z in intS3, which is also the
unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game.
Theorem 2 ([Ze80]) The following conditions are equivalent for the rock-scissors-paper
game given by (10):
(a) z is asymptotically stable,
(b) z is globally stable,
(c) detA > 0,
(d) zTAz > 0.
If detA = 0, then all orbits in intSn are closed orbits around z. If detA < 0, then all
orbits in intSn, apart from the rest point z, converge to the boundary; see Figure 1. More
precisely, for x ∈ intSn, the ω-limit (the set of accumulation points of x(t), for t→ +∞)
is the heteroclinic cycle consisting of the three saddle points ei and the three edges which
connect them (in the sense that these are orbits converging to one vertex for t→ +∞ and
to another for t→ −∞). This is the simplest example showing that NE need not describe
the outcome of the replicator dynamics.
For n = 4, a complete classiﬁcation seems out of reach. Examples show that there exist
periodic attractors, and numerical simulations display chaotic attractors. The problem is
equivalent to the classiﬁcation of three-dimensional Lotka-Volterra equations. Indeed
5
e2 e1
e3
Figure 1: Replicator dynamics for the rock-scissors-paper game with payoﬀ matrix (9)
with ai = 1 and bi = 0.55.
Theorem 3 ([Ho81]) The smooth and invertible map from {x ∈ Sn : xn > 0} onto
Rn−1+ , given by yi =
xi
xn
, maps the orbits of the replicator equation (3) onto the orbits of
the Lotka-Volterra equation
y˙i = yi(ri +
∑
j
cijyj), (10)
i = 1, ..., n− 1, where ri = ain − ann and cij = aij − anj .
The theorem allows us to use the large set of results on Lotka-Volterra equations, which
are a basic model in mathematical ecology. On the other hand, an n-dimensional Lotka–
Volterra equation (10) with equal basic growth rates ri = r reduces with xi = yi/(y1 +
· · ·+yn) to the replicator equation (3) on Sn with cij = aij−α (where α ∈ R is arbitrary).
In particular every replicator equation on Sn can be imbedded into a competitive Lotka–
Volterra equation on Rn+ (choose r > 0 and α > 0 large enough so that cij < 0), which has
a globally attracting invariant manifold called the carrying simplex [Hi88]. In this sense
the classiﬁcation of [Ze80] embeds into the classiﬁcation of three-dimensional competitive
Lotka–Volterra equations of [Ze93]. However, the dynamics of (10) with diﬀerent ri is in
general richer than that with equal ri = r, and the continua of periodic orbits can split
up into several coexisting limit cycles; see [HSo94], [Lu02]. For the present state of the
art see [ZZ02], [ZZ03].
2.5 Permanence
The replicator equation is said to be permanent if there exists a compact set K ⊂ intSn
with the property that for all x ∈ intSn there is a T such that for all t > T one has
x(t) ∈ K. This means roughly that if initially all types (or strategies) are present in the
population, then they will be, in the long run, proof against extinction through small, rare
random shocks.
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Theorem 4 (cf. [HoS88]) If (3) is permanent, then there exists a unique rest point
z ∈ intSn. The time averages along each interior orbit converge to z:
1
T
∫ T
0
xi(t)dt −→ zi (11)
for T → +∞ and i = 1, ..., n. If aii = 0, then
(−1)n−1 detA > 0, zTAz > 0. (12)
Conversely, if the replicator equation (3) has no rest point in intSn, then every orbit
converges to the boundary of Sn.
We note here that if an orbit in intSn has ω-limit points on the boundary, its time-
average need not converge. (For the rock-scissors-paper game, see section 3.5, and also
[Gau92], [Ak93], [GaH95]).
Theorem 5 (cf. [HoS88]) The replicator equation (3) is permanent if there exists a
p ∈ intSn such that
pTAb > bTAb (13)
for all rest points b ∈ bdSn.
Since it is actually enough to check the inequality for the extremal points of the rest
points on the boundary (a union of convex sets), this yields a ﬁnite system of linear
inequalities for p.
Among the many examples of replicator equations we single out those given by the
class of monocyclic payoﬀ matrices A (an n-strategy generalisation of the rock-paper-
scissors case). Such matrices are deﬁned by aii = 0, aij > 0 if i = j + 1 (mod n) and
aij ≤ 0 otherwise. For (3) this implies the existence of a heteroclinic cycle along the edges
1 → 2 → . . . → n → 1 which is attracting within bdSn. The necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for permanence contained in the previous two theorems coincide.
Theorem 6 ([HoS88]) The replicator equation with monocyclic A is permanent iﬀ there
is a rest point z ∈ intSn with z
TAz > 0.
2.6 Mixed strategy dynamics and ESS
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the ‘types’ in the population correspond to the
pure strategies given by the basis vectors ei spanning the simplex Sn. Let us suppose now
that the types may also correspond to mixed strategies p(i) ∈ Sn, with i = 1, ..., N (we
need not assume N = n). The average payoﬀ for an individual of type p(i) against an
individual of type p(j) is uij = p(i)
TAp(j), and if x ∈ SN describes the types’ frequencies
in the population, then the average strategy within the population is p(x) =
∑
xip(i).
The induced replicator equation x˙i = xi((Ux)i − x
TUx) can be written as
x˙i = xi[(p(i)− p(x))
TAp(x)]. (14)
The best-known concept of evolutionary game theory is that of evolutionary stability (see
[MS74], [MS82], [Hi87] and the literature cited there). Intuitively speaking, if all members
in the population use such an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, then no ‘mutant’
minority using another strategy can invade. A strategy pˆ ∈ Sn is said to be evolutionarily
stable if for every p ∈ Sn with p = pˆ, the induced replicator equation describing the
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dynamics of the population consisting of these two types only (the resident using pˆ and
the invader using p) leads to the elimination of the invader as long as the initial frequency
of this invader is suﬃciently small, i.e. below some ‘invasion barrier’ ε(p). By (8) this
equation reads (if x is the frequency of the invader):
x˙ = x(1− x)[x(pTAp− pˆTAp)− (1− x)(pˆTApˆ− pTApˆ)] (15)
and hence the rest point x = 0 is asymptotically stable iﬀ the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(a) (equilibrium condition)
pTApˆ ≤ pˆTApˆ (16)
(b) (stability condition)
if pTApˆ = pˆTApˆ, then pTAp < pˆTAp. (17)
The ﬁrst condition means that pˆ is a Nash equilibrium: no invader does better than the
resident against the resident. The second condition states that if the invader does as well
as the resident against the resident, then it does less well than the resident against the
invader. (Note that x = 0 may well be asymptotically stable, and hence pˆ is an ESS, if
the replicator dynamics (15) is bistable: in this case, type p can invade if it enters the
population with a frequency which is suﬃciently high – viz., larger than the ‘invasion
barrier’ ε(p).)
Theorem 7 ([HoSS79]) The strategy pˆ is an ESS iﬀ
∏
i x
pˆi
i is a strict local Lyapunov
function for the replicator equation, or equivalently iﬀ
pˆTAp > pTAp (18)
for all p = pˆ in some neighborhood of pˆ. If pˆ ∈ intSn, then (18) holds for all p ∈ Sn.
(The function V (x) is said to be a Lyapunov function if V˙ (x) ≥ 0 for all x, and strict if
equality holds only when x is a rest point.)
In particular, an ESS is an asymptotically stable rest point, and an interior ESS is
globally stable. The converse does not hold in general. But
Theorem 8 ([Cr90], [Cr92]) The strategy pˆ ∈ Sn is an ESS iﬀ it is strongly stable.
Here, pˆ is said to be strongly stable if, whenever it is in the convex hull of p(1), ...,p(N ) ∈
Sn, the strategy p(x(t)) converges to pˆ, under (14), for all x ∈ SN for which p(x) is suf-
ﬁciently close to pˆ.
The relation between evolutionary and dynamic stability is particularly simple for the
class of partnership games, deﬁned by A = AT , for which the interests of both players
coincide. For such games, pˆ is an ESS iﬀ it is asymptotically stable for (3). This holds iﬀ
it is a strict local maximum of the average payoﬀ xTAx.
Many interesting games have no ESS. Often, it is useful to consider a generalisation
(see [Th85], [BoP89], [Sw92], [Bo98], [BaS00], [Cr03]): a set G ⊂ Sn is said to be an ES
set if for all xˆ ∈ G and all x ∈ Sn
xTAxˆ ≤ xˆTAxˆ (19)
holds, and if for all xˆ ∈ G and x ∈ Sn \G for which equality holds,
xTAx < xˆTAx. (20)
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A singleton set G = {xˆ} is an ES set iﬀ xˆ is an ESS. All elements of an ES set G are NE
which are neutrally stable in the sense that for x, xˆ ∈ G the equality xˆTAx = xTAx holds
whenever xTAxˆ = xˆTAxˆ. A set G is an ES set iﬀ each xˆ ∈ G has a neighborhood U such
that xTAx ≤ xˆTAx with equality iﬀ x ∈ G. If G contains an xˆ ∈ intSn, then U can be
chosen to be Sn. An ES set G is uninvadable in the sense that there exists an ǫ > 0 such
that any strategy xˆ ∈ G cannot be invaded by a minority of x /∈ G as long as its frequency
is below ǫ.
Any strategy in an ES set is stable, and any ES set is asymptotically stable. If an ES
set G contains a point xˆ in intSn, then all orbits in the interior of Sn converge to G (see
[Cr03]).
2.7 Bimatrix games
Let us return now to asymmetric games deﬁned by two matrices A and B, also called
bimatrix games. If the two roles correspond to two populations, the ansatz leading to the
replicator equation now yields
x˙i = xi[(Ay)i − x
TAy] (21)
y˙j = yj [(B
Tx)j − x
TBy] (22)
on Sn × Sm. Again, faces and interiors are invariant. In [EsAk83] and [HoS88], [HoSi98]
it is shown that up to a change in velocity, the corresponding ﬂow in int(Sn × Sm) is
incompressible. Hence there can be no attractors (and in particular no asymptotically
stable rest point) in the interior. Indeed, a rest point is asymptotically stable iﬀ it is a
strict NE. (These results extend from two-player games to N -player games [RiW95], but
others go wrong for N ≥ 3 due to nonlinearity of the payoﬀ functions; see [Pl97]). A good
way to analyze (21)-(22) is to transform it into a bipartite system of the form
u˙ = f(v), v˙ = g(u), u ∈ Rn−1, v ∈ Rm−1. (23)
From this representation the preservation of volume and the Hamiltonian character of the
linearization near interior equilibria become obvious [Ho96].
Again, in two dimensions, i.e. for n = m = 2, a complete classiﬁcation of phase
portraits of (21)-(22) is available, see [HoS88], [HoSi98] for the four generic cases and
[Cr03] for the degenerate cases.
In analogy to ES sets, SE (strict equilibria) sets are deﬁned as sets G ⊆ Sn × Sm
of Nash equilibria such that xˆTAyˆ > xTAyˆ whenever (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ G and (x, yˆ) /∈ G, and
similarly with x and y interchanged (see [Cr03]). This is equivalent to deﬁning an SE set
G as a set of Nash equilibria such that whenever xTAyˆ = xˆTAyˆ, then (x, yˆ) ∈ G and
similarly with x and y interchanged. Strict NE are exactly the singleton SE sets, and
generalising the singleton situation, a set of rest points is asymptotically stable iﬀ it is an
SE set. Such sets are ﬁnite unions of products of faces of Sn and Sm. If A = B and G
is an SE set, then the ﬁrst component of its intersection with the diagonal of Sn × Sn is
either empty or an ES set [Cr03].
The canonical way to turn a bimatrix game (A,B) into a symmetric game consists
in assuming that chance decides which player is in which role: role I will be adopted
with probability p (with 0 < p < 1). The players’ strategies must therefore allow for
both situations and are of the form (i, j): in role I, play i ∈ Strat(I), in role II play
j ∈ Strat(II). The payoﬀ matrix C is an nm×nm matrix, with cij,kl := pail+(1−p)bkj .
The symmetric game with this matrix is said to be the symmetrized version of the bimatrix
game. For any z = (zij) ∈ Snm, marginals x ∈ Sn and y ∈ Sm are deﬁned by xi :=
∑
j zij
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and yj :=
∑
i zij. Conversely, for any given x ∈ Sn and y ∈ Sm, there is at least one
z ∈ Snm such that x and y are its marginals, namely zij := xiyj .
There exists a symmetric NE zˆ ∈ Snm for the symmetrized game with matrix C. Since
zˆ is a best reply to itself,
zTCzˆ ≤ zˆTCzˆ (24)
for all z ∈ Snm. Hence
pxTAyˆ+ (1− p)xˆTBy ≤ pxˆTAyˆ + (1− p)xˆTByˆ. (25)
In particular, if x = xˆ and y is arbitrary, this implies that yˆ is a best reply to xˆ and
vice versa; i.e. (xˆ, yˆ) is an NE.
The replicator equation on Snm is
z˙ij = zij[(ei, fj)− z]
TCz. (26)
Since (zij/zil)
. = (1− p)(zij/zil)x
TB(fj − fl) the quotient
zijzkl
zilzkj
is a constant of motion.
Thus Snm foliates into invariant submanifolds (see [GaHS91], [CrGW00], [Cr03]). In par-
ticular, since the set {z ∈ Snm : zijzkl = zilzkj , 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n,
1 ≤ j, l ≤ m} is just the so-called Wright manifold W = {z ∈ Snm : zij = xiyj,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, this (n + m − 2)-dimensional submanifold of Snm is invari-
ant. On this set, the average strategies in the two roles are independent. The dynamics
(26) simpliﬁes on W to yield
x˙i = pxi[(Ay)i− x
TAy] (27)
and
y˙j = (1− p)yj[(B
Tx)j − x
TBy] (28)
on Sn×Sm. Up to the positive factors p and 1−p, this is just the two-population replicator
equation (21)-(22).
In the case n = m = 2, (26) is a replicator equation whose matrix, after adding
appropriate constants to the columns, is of the form
M =


0 0 0 0
R R S S
R+ r R+ s S + s S + r
r s s r

 (29)
The signs of R, S, r and s yield the orientation of the ﬂow on the edges e1f1−e2f1−e2f2−
e1f2 − e1f1 spanning the invariant manifolds WK = {z ∈ S4 : z11z22 = Kz21z12} (for each
K > 0) and determine the phase portraits [GaHS91]. Rest points in the interior of S4 (one
on each WK) exist iﬀ RS > 0 and rs > 0. If Rr > 0, the dynamics is bistable: all interior
rest points are of saddle type (within their manifold WK), and up to a set of measure
zero, all orbits converge to one of two opposite corner points of S4. If Rr < 0, we obtain
the cyclic 2× 2-game where the ﬂow-induced orientations of the edges form a cycle: W1
is ﬁlled in this case with periodic orbits surrounding the rest point, whereas generically,
if K > 0 is on one side of 1, all orbits on WK spiral towards the interior rest point, and
if K is on the other side, all orbits spiral away from it and towards the heteroclinic cycle
formed by the edges spanning WK .
In general, a setG ⊆ Snm is an ES set of the symmetrized game iﬀG = {z : (x, y) ∈ H}
where x ∈ Sn and y ∈ Sm are the marginals of z and H is an SE set of the bimatrix game.
This implies that each ESS of the symmetrized game corresponds to a strict NE pair
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(ei, fj) of the asymmetric game. The ES sets are exactly the asymptotically stable sets of
rest points of the symmetrized replicator equation (26). A mixed NE of the symmetrized
game cannot be an ESS [Se80].
A bimatrix game (A,B) is said to be a c-partnership game, resp. c-zerosum game (for
some c > 0 resp. c < 0), if there exist suitable constants dij, cj and di such that
aij = dij + cj and bij = cdij + di. (30)
Such games have the same Nash equilibria as the games (D,D), resp. (D,−D). If there
exists an NE pair (xˆ, yˆ) in the interior of Sn × Sm, then the function
H(x, y) = c
∑
xˆi logxi −
∑
yˆj log yj (31)
is a constant of motion for (21)-(22) and even a Hamiltonian function. In particular, an
interior equilibrium of a c-zerosum game is always stable (but not asymptotically stable).
Theorem 9 ([HoS88], [MoSh96a], [HoSi98]) The game (A,B) is a c-partnership game
iﬀ one of the following conditions holds:
(i) for all i, k ∈ {1, ..., n} and j, l ∈ {1, ...,m}
c(aij − ail − akj + akl) = bij − bil − bkj + bkl; (32)
(ii) there exist ui, vj such that Q = cA−B satisﬁes qij = ui + vj for all i and j;
(iii) for all ξ ∈ Rn0 and all η ∈ R
m
0
cξTAη = ξTBη. (33)
A related result holds for N–person games; see [MoSh96a].
For games with two populations, the usual interpretation of evolutionary stability
makes little sense, since invaders from one population do not interact with their own
population. A weak analog is the following. A pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) is said to be a Nash-
Pareto pair if it is a Nash equilibrium and if, in addition, for all states (x, y) ∈ Sn × Sm
with x ∈ BR(yˆ) and y ∈ BR(xˆ),
if xTAy > xˆTAy, then xTBy < xTByˆ (34)
and
if xTBy > xTByˆ, then xTAy < xˆTAy. (35)
Thus it is impossible that both players get an advantage by deviating from the equilibrium.
Theorem 10 ([HoS88]) (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ int(Sn × Sm) is a Nash-Pareto pair iﬀ there exists a
constant c > 0 such that
c(x− xˆ)TAy + xTB(y− yˆ) = 0 (36)
for all (x, y) ∈ int(Sn× Sm), i.e. iﬀ (A,B) is a (-c)-zerosum game. Such a Nash-Pareto-
pair is stable for the replicator equation (21)-(22).
In this case, (21)-(22) is a Hamiltonian system with respect to a suitable Poisson
structure. The dynamics on the energy levels can be complicated; see [Sat02] for chaos
in an asymmetric rock-scissors-paper game. For general bimatrix games, a normal form
analysis near interior equilibria for n = m = 3 shows their generic instability [Ho96]. This
suggests the
Conjecture 1 If an interior equilibrium is isolated and stable under (21)-(22), then it is
a Nash-Pareto pair.
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3 Other game dynamics
3.1 Nonlinear payoﬀ functions
We have assumed so far that the average payoﬀ to strategy i is given by a linear function
(Ax)i. This makes sense if the interactions are pairwise, with co-players chosen randomly
within the population. But many interesting examples lead to non-linear payoﬀ functions
ai(x), for instance if the interactions occur in groups with more than two members. This
leads to the replicator equation
x˙i = xi(ai(x)− a¯) (37)
on Sn, where a¯ =
∑
i xiai(x) is again the average payoﬀ within the population. Many of
the previous results can be extended in a straightforward way, sometimes in a localised
version. For instance, the dynamics is unchanged under addition of a function ψ to all
payoﬀ functions ai. The existence of Nash equilibria can be shown as in Theorem 1 by
perturbing (37) (see [HoSi98]), and a straight extension of the folk theorem is still valid.
An xˆ is said to be a local ESS if xˆTa(x) > xTa(x) for all x = xˆ in some neighborhood of
xˆ [Th85]. It can be characterised by a localised version of the equilibrium and stability
condition, and it is an asymptotically stable rest point of (37). There are several look-alike
contenders for the notion of an ES set (see [Th85], [Bo98] and [BaS00]).
An important class of payoﬀ functions is given by potentials. For this, it is useful to
introduce a Riemannian metric (the so-called Shahshahani metric) in the interior of Sn by
the inner product
(ξ, η)x =
∑ 1
xi
ξiηi (38)
for the vectors ξ and η belonging to Rn0 = {ξ ∈ R
n :
∑
ξi = 0}, i.e. to the tangent space of
x ∈ intSn (see [Ak79]). Equation (37) is a Shahshahani gradient if there exists a potential
function V , in the sense that
(x˙, ξ)x = DxV (ξ) (39)
for all ξ ∈ Rn0 . In [HoS88] it is shown that this is the case iﬀ
∂ai
∂xj
+
∂aj
∂xk
+
∂ak
∂xi
=
∂ai
∂xk
+
∂ak
∂xj
+
∂aj
∂xi
(40)
for all i, j, k ∈ {1, ..., n}, a condition which is trivially satisﬁed if n = 2. If the payoﬀ matrix
A describes a partnership game (i.e. A = AT ), then V (x) = 12x
TAx is such a potential,
and the induced equation (14) for the mixed types is also a Shahshahani gradient [Si87].
For interesting applications to optimization problems see [Bo02]. For bimatrix games, an
obvious variant can be introduced; the replicator equation (21)-(22) is then a gradient for
the c-partnership games, with potential function xTDy with D given by (30).
As with bimatrix games, non-linear two-population games can be symmetrized, the
dynamics admits invariant submanifolds, etc. Of particular interest for ecological scenarios
are payoﬀ functions which depend, not only on the frequency of the strategies in the other
population, but also on the strategy distribution in the resident population, and on the
densities of one or both populations. For this we refer to [Cr95], [Cr03], and for the
N -species case to [CrGH01].
3.2 Imitation dynamics
Strategies can be transmitted within a population through imitation. Such a process can
be modelled in many ways. Following Weibull [We95], let us ﬁrst assume that individuals
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Figure 2: Imitate the better dynamics for the rock-scissors-paper game with payoﬀ matrix
(9) with ai = 1 and bi = 0.55.
occasionally chose at random another player in the population, and adopt the strategy
of this ‘model’ with a certain probability which can depend on the payoﬀ diﬀerence, the
frequency of the strategies, etc. This ansatz yields an input-output model
x˙i = xi
∑
j
[fij(x)− fji(x)]xj (41)
with fij as the rate at which a player of type j adopts type i; see [Ho95b], [HoSi98]. A
plausible assumption is that this rate depends only on the payoﬀs achieved by the two
players, i.e.
fij(x) = f(ai(x), aj(x)) (42)
where f(u, v) deﬁnes the imitation rule (the same for all players). The simplest rule is to
imitate the better, i.e.
f(u, v) = 0 if u < v and f(u, v) = 1 if u > v, (43)
which however leads to a discontinuous right hand side. In this case a strategy increases
iﬀ its payoﬀ is larger than the median of the payoﬀ values a1(x), ..., an(x) [FL98] (whereas
it increases for the replicator equation iﬀ it exceeds the mean). In a region of Sn deﬁned
by a given rank-ordering of the payoﬀ values (for instance a1(x) > a2(x) > · · · > an(x)),
the dynamics reduces to a replicator equation with a skew-symmetric matrix A consisting
only of 0’s and ±1’s (in the example, aij = 1 if j > i, aij = −1 for j < i, and aii = 0);
see [Ho95b]. Figure 2 describes the phase portrait of a rock-scissors-paper game for this
dynamic.
The assumption in (42) that f(u, v) is an increasing function φ(u − v) of the payoﬀ
diﬀerence is also plausible. This leads to imitation dynamics of the form
x˙i = xi
∑
j
ψ(ai(x)− aj(x))xj (44)
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with an increasing and odd function ψ. In particular, choosing φ(z) = 0 for z ≤ 0 and
φ(z) = αz for z > 0 (and some positive constant α) turns (44) into the replicator equation
(37). If players use this rule (the proportional imitation rule of [Sc97]; see also [Cr03]),
they imitate strategies with a higher payoﬀ, with a probability which is proportional to
the expected gain obtained by switching. A more general approach leads to
x˙i = xi[f(ai(x))−
∑
xjf(aj(x))] (45)
for some strictly increasing function f . This equation arises for the imitation rule f(u, v) =
f(u)−f(v). If f is linear, one obtains again the replicator equation (37). Similarly, for the
imitation rules f(u, v) = f(u) − c, or for f(u, v) = c− f(v), i.e. if the rate depends only
on the payoﬀ of the imitating or of the imitated player, one obtains the equation (45).
The most general form of an imitation dynamics is given by
x˙i = xigi(x) (46)
where the functions gi satisfy
∑
xigi(x) = 0 on Sn. The simplex Sn and its faces are
invariant. Such an equation is said to be payoﬀ monotonic [Fr91], [We95] if
gi(x) > gj(x)⇔ ai(x) > aj(x). (47)
All imitation dynamics encountered so far have this property. For payoﬀ monotonic equa-
tions (46) the folk theorem holds again: NE are rest points, strict NE are asymptotically
stable, and rest points that are stable or ω-limits of interior orbits are NE.
The dynamics (46) is said to be aggregate monotonic [SaZ92] if
yTg(x) > zTg(x)⇐⇒ yTa(x) > zTa(x) (48)
for all x, y, z ∈ Sn. It turns out that all aggregate monotonic imitation dynamics reduce
(through a change in velocity) to replicator dynamics (37). Cressman [Cr97] shows that
the linearization at a rest point of a payoﬀ monotonic dynamic (47) is proportional to that
of the replicator dynamics. In particular, regular ESS are asymptotically stable for any
smooth dynamics (47) satisfying some mild regularity condition.
A pure strategy i is said to be strictly dominated if there exists some y ∈ Sn such that
ai(x) < y
Ta(x) (49)
for all x ∈ Sn. A rational player will not use such a strategy. If such strategies are
eliminated, it may happen that in the reduced game, some additional strategies are strictly
dominated. One may repeat this elimination procedure a ﬁnite number of times. The
strategies eliminated this way are said to be iteratively strictly dominated. If all players
are rational and this is common knowledge among them, these strategies will be not be
used.
For a large class of evolutionary dynamics, iteratively strictly dominated strategies can
similarly be discarded, even if players are not assumed to be rational. More precisely, this
holds if game dynamics (46) is convex monotone in the sense that
ai(x) < y
Ta(x)⇒ gi(x) < y
Tg(x) (50)
for all i and all x, y ∈ Sn.
Theorem 11 ([HoW96]) If the game dynamics (46) is convex monotone and strategy i
is iteratively strictly dominated, then xi(t)→ 0 for t→ +∞ along interior solutions.
14
If the dominating strategy y in (49) is pure, then this result follows already from (47).
Thus selection eliminates strictly dominated strategies just as rational players would do.
However, this appealing property holds for fewer dynamics than one might expect. An
equation of type (45) is convex monotone iﬀ f is convex. If f is not convex, there exist
games with strictly dominated strategies that survive along an open set of orbits; see
[HoW96], [HoSi98]. For the other class of imitation dynamics (44) the situation is even
worse: For essentially all nonlinear ψ survival of strictly dominated strategies is possible
(see [Ho95b] and for related results [Se98]).
[HoSc00] studies imitation dynamics where imitators observe not one but N individ-
uals. For cyclic 2 × 2 games this stabilizes the equilibrium for N ≥ 2, and in the limit
N →∞ this yields
x˙i = xi[ai(y)/x
Ta(y)− 1]
y˙j = yj[bj(x)/y
Tb(x)− 1],
which is Maynard Smith’s version of the two-population replicator equation [MS82].
We conclude with some open problems from [Ho95b]: Are interior ESS globally
stable for (45) with convex f? This holds for n = 3. For every nonconvex f there are
counterexamples. Does (44) have a constant of motion for zero-sum games? Again, this
holds for n = 3, even in the limit case of the ‘imitate the better’ rule (43).
3.3 Best response dynamics
Learning through imitation makes only modest requirements on the cognitive capabilities
of the players. The best response dynamics [GiM91], [Ma92], [Ho95a] assumes more so-
phistication: in a large population, a small fraction of the players revise their strategy,
choosing best replies BR(x) to the current mean population strategy x. This approach,
which postulates that players are intelligent enough to gauge the current population state
and to respond optimally, yields the best response (BR) dynamics
x˙ ∈ BR(x)− x. (51)
Since best replies are in general not unique, this is a diﬀerential inclusion rather than a
diﬀerential equation [AuC84]. For continuous payoﬀ functions ai(x) the right hand side is
a non-empty, convex, compact subset of Sn which is upper semi-continuous in x. Hence
solutions exist that are Lipschitz functions x(t) satisfying (51) for almost all t ≥ 0.
If BR(x) is a uniquely deﬁned (and hence pure) strategy b, the solution of (51) is
given by
x(t) = (1− e−t)b+ e−tx (52)
for small t ≥ 0, which describes a linear orbit pointing straight towards the best reply. This
can lead to a state where b is no longer the unique best reply. But for each x there always
exists a b ∈ BR(x) which, among all best replies to x, is a best reply against itself (i.e. an
NE of the game restricted to the simplex BR(x)), and then b ∈ BR((1− ǫ)x+ ǫb) holds
for small ǫ ≥ 0 if the game is linear. An iteration of this construction yields at least one
piecewise linear solution of (51) through x deﬁned for all t > 0. One can show [Ho95a] that
for generic linear games essentially all solutions can be constructed in this way. For the
resulting (multi-valued) semi-dynamical system, the simplex Sn is only forward invariant
and bdSn need no longer be invariant: the frequency of strategies which are initially
missing can grow, in contrast to the imitation dynamics. In this sense, the best response
dynamics is an innovative dynamics.
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Figure 3: Best response dynamics for the rock-scissors-paper game with payoﬀ matrix (9)
with ai = 1 and bi = 0.55.
For n = 2, the phase portraits of (51) diﬀer only in details from that of the replicator
dynamics. If e1 is dominated by e2, there are only two orbits: the rest point e2, and the
semi-orbit through e1 which converges to e2. In the bistable situation with interior NE
p, there are inﬁnitely many solutions starting at p besides the constant one, staying there
for some time and then converging monotonically to either e1 or e2. In the case of stable
coexistence with interior NE p, the solution starting at some point x between p and e1
converges toward e2 until it hits p and then remains there forever. (In the trivial game,
with a continuum of equilibria, every Lipschitz curve in S2 is a solution.)
For n = 3, the diﬀerences to the replicator dynamics become more pronounced. In
particular, for the rock-scissors-paper game given by (9), all orbits converge to the Nash
equilibrium p whenever detA > 0 (just as with the replicator dynamics), but for detA < 0,
all orbits (except possibly p) converge to a limit cycle, the so-called Shapley triangle
spanned by the three points Ai (where A1 is the solution of (Ax)2 = (Ax)3 = 0, etc.);
see Figure 3. In fact, the piecewise linear function V (x) := |maxi(Ax)i| is a Lyapunov
function for (51). In this case, the orbits of the replicator equation (3) converge to the
boundary of Sn, but interestingly, the time averages
z(T ) :=
1
T
∫ T
0
x(t)dt (53)
have the Shapley triangle as a set of accumulation points, for T → +∞. Similar parallels
between the best response dynamics and the behaviour of time-averages of the replicator
equation are quite frequent; see [GaH95].
Obviously, strict NE are asymptotically stable, and strictly dominated strategies are
eliminated along all solutions of the best response dynamics. For interior NE of linear
games the following stability result is shown in [Ho95a].
Let B = {b ∈ bdSn : (Ab)i = (Ab)j for all i, j ∈ supp(b)} denote the set of all rest
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points of (3) on the boundary. Then the function
w(x) = max
{∑
b∈B
bTAb u(b) : u(b) ≥ 0,
∑
b∈B
u(b) = 1,
∑
b∈B
u(b)b = x
}
(54)
can be interpreted in the following way. Imagine the population in state x being de-
composed into subpopulations of size u(b) which are in states b ∈ B, and call this a
B–segregation of b. Then w(x) is the maximum mean payoﬀ population x can obtain by
such a B–segregation. It is the smallest concave function satisfying w(b) ≥ bTAb for all
b ∈ B.
Theorem 12 ([Ho95a]) The following three conditions are equivalent:
a. There is a vector p ∈ Sn, such that p
TAb > bTAb holds for all b ∈ B.
b. V (x) = maxi(Ax)i −w(x) > 0 for all x ∈ Sn.
c. There exist a unique interior equilibrium xˆ and xˆTAxˆ > w(xˆ).
These conditions imply: xˆ is reached in ﬁnite and bounded time by any BR path.
The proof consists in showing that the function V from (b) decreases along the paths
of (51). Note that condition (a) is a suﬃcient condition for permanence of the replicator
dynamics (3); see section 2.5. It is an open problem whether for generic payoﬀ matrices A,
permanence of the replicator equation is equivalent to the global stability of the interior
equilibrium under the best response dynamics.
Let us discuss some examples of this general stability result. If p > 0 is an interior
ESS, then condition (a) holds not only for all b ∈ B but for all b = p. In this case the
simpler Lyapunov function V (x) = maxi(Ax)i − x
TAx ≥ 0 can also be used; see [Ho00].
With similar arguments, asymptotic stability of any boundary ESS can be shown.
In the rock-scissors-paper game, the set B reduces to the set of pure strategies, and the
Lyapunov function is simply V (x) = maxi(Ax)i.The same applies to the more general class
of monocyclic matrices considered in section 2.5. For these games, the above conditions
essentially characterize stability of the interior equilibrium.
All ES sets are forward invariant under the best response dynamics, but whether they
are asymptotically stable is an open question; see [Cr03]. Cressman [Cr03] computes the
global attractor of the BR dynamics for certain extensive form games.
For bimatrix games the best response dynamics reads
x˙ ∈ BR(y)− x y˙ ∈ BR(x)− y. (55)
Modulo a time change it is equivalent to the continuous time version of ﬁctitious play
[Br51], in which Brown sketched a proof of convergence to equilibria for zero-sum games
using the Lyapunov function V (x, y) = maxi(Ay)i −minj(x
TA)j. Since
max
i
(Ay)i ≥ x
TAy ≥ min
j
(xTA)j, (56)
we have V (x, y) ≥ 0, with equality exactly at NE pairs of the game. One can show
[Ho95a], [Har98] that V (t) := V (x(t), y(t)) satisﬁes V˙ (t) = −V (t) along every solution
of the diﬀerential inclusion (55). Hence the global attractor coincides with the set of
equilibrium pairs.
For the special case of the matching pennies game with n = 2, a11 = a22 = 1 and
a12 = a21 = −1, the above Lyapunov function reads V (x, y) = |1 − 2x|+ |1− 2y|, which
is essentially the ℓ1 distance from the equilibrium (12 ,
1
2).
This result has recently been generalized to non-linear concave-convex zero-sum games
[HoSo02]. There seems little hope to extend it beyond zero-sum games:
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Conjecture 2 ([Ho95a]) Let (p, q) > 0 be an isolated interior equilibrium of a bimatrix
game (A,B), which is stable under the BR dynamics. Then (A,B) is a c-zerosum game.
[Se00] and [Ber03] prove convergence to NE in 2 × 3, resp. 2×m-games. For n,m ≥
3 limit cycles (Shapley polygons) were found in [Sh64] and studied further in [Ro71],
[GaH95], [KrS98], [FoY98]. A chaotic attractor for the BR dynamics has been constructed
by Cowan [Co92].
The best response dynamics for the symmetrized game has been studied in [Ber01],
[Ber02], [Cr03]. The Wright manifold is no longer invariant. But in the cyclic 2× 2-game
(see (29), all trajectories outside the line of NE converge to the unique Nash equilibrium on
the Wright manifold (see [Ber01]), which is a much stabler behaviour than the replicator
dynamics (3) exhibits. A similar result holds if (A,B) is a c-zerosum game; see [Ber02].
3.4 Smoothed best replies
The BR dynamics can be approximated by smooth dynamics such as the logit dynamics
x˙i =
eai(x)/ε∑
j e
aj(x)/ε
− xi (57)
with ε > 0. As ε → 0, this converges to the best response dynamics, and every family of
rest points xˆ(ε) accumulates in the set of Nash equilibria. There are (at least) two ways
to motivate and generalize this ‘smoothing’.
While BR(x) is the set of maximizers of the linear function z →
∑
i ziai(x) on Sn,
consider bεv(x), the unique maximizer of the function z →
∑
i ziai(x) + εv(z) on intSn,
where v is a strictly concave function intSn → R such that |v
′(z)| → ∞ as z approaches
the boundary of Sn. If v is the entropy −
∑
zi log zi, the corresponding smoothed best
response dynamics
x˙ = bεv(x)− x (58)
reduces to (57) above [FL98].
Another way to perturb best replies are stochastic perturbations. Let ε be a random
vector in Rn distributed according to some positive density function. For z ∈ Rn, let
Ci(z) = Prob(zi + εi ≥ zj + εj ∀j), (59)
and b(x) = C(a(x)). It can be shown [HoSa02] that each such stochastic perturbation
can be represented by a deterministic perturbation as described before. The main idea is
that there is a potential function W : Rn → R, with ∂W∂ai = Ci(a) which is convex and
has −v as its Legendre transform. If the (εi) are i.i.d. with the extreme value distribution
F (x) = exp(− exp(−x)), then Ci(a) =
eai∑
j
e
aj is the logit choice function and we obtain
(57).
For the logit dynamics (57) and more generally (58), Lyapunov functions have been
found for partnership games, zero-sum games and games with an interior ESS (see [Ho00]).
Analogous results for bimatrix games are given in [HoH02].
An interesting class of games are the supermodular games (also known as games with
strict strategic complementarities) [FT91] which are deﬁned, with ai,j =
∂ai
∂xj
, by
ai+1,j+1 − ai,j+1 − ai+1,j + ai,j > 0 ∀i, j (60)
at every x ∈ Sn. Stochastic dominance deﬁnes a partial order on the simplex Sn:
p  p′ ⇔
m∑
k=1
pk ≤
m∑
k=1
p′k ∀m = 1, . . . , n− 1. (61)
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If all inequalities in (61) are strict, we write p ≻ p′. The pure strategies are totally
ordered: e1 ≺ e2 · · · ≺ en.
The crucial property of supermodular games is the monotonicity of the best reply
correspondence: If x  y, x = y, then maxBR(x) ≤ minBR(y). This property was used
in [Kr92] to prove convergence of ﬁctitious play, and in [HoSa02] the result was extended
to perturbed best response maps.
Theorem 13 ([HoSa02]) For every supermodular game
x  y, x = y ⇒ C(a(x)) ≺ C(a(y))
holds if the choice function C : Rn → Sn is C
1 and the partial derivatives Ci,j =
∂Ci
∂aj
satisfy for all 1 ≤ k, l < n
k∑
i=1
l∑
j=1
Ci,j > 0, (62)
and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
j=1
Ci,j = 0. (63)
The conditions (62), (63) on C hold for every stochastic choice model (59), since there
Ci,j < 0 for i = j. As a consequence, the perturbed best response dynamics
x˙ = C(a(x))− x (64)
generates a strongly monotone ﬂow: If x(0)  y(0), x(0) = y(0), then x(t) ≺ y(t) for all
t > 0. The theory of monotone ﬂows developed by Hirsch [Hi88] and others (see [Sm95])
implies that almost all solutions of (64) converge to a rest point of (64).
3.5 The Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics
The Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics (BNN) is deﬁned as
x˙i = ki(x)− xi
n∑
j=1
kj(x), (65)
where
ki(x) = max(0, ai(x)− x
Ta(x)) (66)
denotes the positive part of the excess payoﬀ for strategy i. This dynamics is closely
related to the continuous map f : Sn → Sn deﬁned by
fi(x) =
xi + ki(x)
1 +
∑n
j=1 kj(x)
, (67)
which Nash used (see [Na51]) to prove the existence of equilibria by applying Brouwer’s
ﬁxed point theorem: It is easy to see that xˆ is a ﬁxed point of f iﬀ it is a rest point of
(65) iﬀ ki(xˆ) = 0 for all i, i.e. iﬀ xˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The diﬀerential equation (65) had been considered earlier by Brown and von Neumann
[Br49], [BrN50] in the special case of (linear) zero-sum games, for which they proved global
convergence to the set of equilibria. This result was extended in [Ni59], where generaliza-
tions of (65) were interpreted as price adjustment processes. While Nash’s map (67) played
a crucial role in economic equilibrium theory, (65) was revived as an evolutionary game
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dynamics by Skyrms [Sk90] and studied further in [Sw93], [Ber98], [Ho00], [Sa01]. Sand-
holm [Sa02] found a fascinating connection of generalizations of (65) to the regret-based
learning models for repeated games of [HaM01].
Equation (65) deﬁnes an ‘innovative better reply’ dynamics. Indeed, strategies with
payoﬀ below average decrease in frequency, while strategies with payoﬀ above average
increase, as long as they are rare enough (and even if their frequency is 0). In contrast
to the best response dynamics, (65) is Lipschitz (if payoﬀs are Lipschitz) and hence has
unique solutions.
For linear games, a regular ESS is asymptotically stable, and an interior ESS is a global
attractor; see [Ho00]. In partnership games, average payoﬀ increases monotonically, and
every orbit converges to the set of equilibria. We refer to [Ber98] for further results
(especially on rock-scissors-paper games) and to [Sa02] for extensions to non-linear games.
Interestingly, strictly dominated strategies can survive under this dynamics, as shown in
[BerH02].
We conclude with a result that summarizes the similar stability properties for all the
game dynamics presented so far, in terms of (negative or positive) deﬁniteness of the payoﬀ
matrix A. Recall Rn0 = {ξ ∈ R
n :
∑
i ξi = 0}.
Theorem 14 (i) If ξTAξ < 0 for all non-zero ξ ∈ Rn0 (i.e., the mean payoﬀ function
xTAx is strictly concave on Sn), then the game has a unique (symmetric) NE xˆ. This
NE xˆ is an ESS. xˆ is globally stable for the replicator dynamics (3), the best response
dynamics (51), and the BNN dynamics (65).
(ii) If ξTAξ ≤ 0 for all ξ ∈ Rn0 , then the set E of NE is convex. E is stable for (3),
and globally stable for (51) and (65). The perturbed dynamics (58) has a unique rest point
xˆ(ε) for each ε > 0. xˆ(ε) is globally stable for (58).
(iii) If ξTAξ > 0 for all non-zero ξ ∈ Rn0 (i.e., the mean payoﬀ function x
TAx is
strictly convex on Sn) and there exists an interior NE xˆ, then xˆ is globally repelling for
(3) and locally repelling for (51) and (65). For small ε > 0, the rest point xˆ(ε) near xˆ is
locally repelling for (58).
This result follows for the replicator equation from [HoSi98], and for the other dynamics
from [Ho00], [Hop99b] and [BerH02]. It can be extended to non-linear payoﬀ functions
(for BNN see [Sa02]). Zero-sum games which satisfy (ii) lie on the border between stability
and instability. An instructive special case is the rock-scissors-paper game (9) with cyclic
symmetry (ai = a, bi = b). For a < b, a = b, and a > b this game belongs to the cases (i),
(ii), and (iii), respectively. The intuitive reason why for a > b the unique equilibrium xˆ is
unstable for every reasonable evolutionary dynamics is that at xˆ the population earns in
this case less than along the best reply cycle e1 → e2 → e3 → e1.
3.6 The adjustment property
The adjustment property, introduced in [Sw93], is deﬁned by
x˙Ta(x) ≥ 0 (68)
in Sn, with strict inequality whenever x is not a Nash equilibrium (or a rest point of
the replicator dynamics). Any vector ﬁeld on Sn satisfying this property is said to be
a myopic adjustment dynamics (MAD). This means that the population always moves
towards a better reply to the present state – arguably, a minimal requirement for any
adaptation worth its name. All dynamics considered so far, except those in section 3.4
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of course, satisfy the adjustment property (for monotone selection dynamics, see [Ho95b],
[FL98]).
For myopic adjustment dynamics, a strict NE is always asymptotically stable. Inter-
estingly, if xˆ is an interior equilibrium, then the dynamics heading straight towards it, i.e.
x˙ = xˆ− x, belongs to the MAD class iﬀ xˆ is an ESS. For a partnership game, the mean
payoﬀ xTAx increases along orbits [Ho95b], [Sa01].
However, as simple counterexamples show, the deﬁnite stability and instability results
in the previous theorem do not apply to myopic adjustment dynamics in general. Indeed,
for every linear game with a unique NE p one can construct myopic adjustment dynamics
having p as the global attractor.
Hence the question arises whether there is an adjustment dynamics that always (i.e.,
for every game, from every initial condition) converges to equilibrium. The answer is
no: there exist one-parameter families of games, each having a unique, interior Nash
equilibrium p, such that for every MAD depending continuously on the game, there is an
open set of parameters for which an open set of orbits does not approach p ([HoSw96];
see also [HoSi98]).
This shows that the non-convergence of orbits to NE is not a weakness of this or that
particular dynamics, but that there are situations where no evolutionary approach can be
reduced to an equilibrium analysis. Every ‘reasonable’ dynamic approach leads to regular
or irregular cycling behaviour for certain games.
4 Extensions
4.1 Population genetics
The ﬁrst applications of evolutionary games concerned animals without the cognitive ca-
pacities to imitate and to learn (see [MS74], [MS82]). Their behavioural programs were
inherited. The original motivation of the replicator dynamics was ‘like begets like’: the
diﬀerent types were supposed to breed true. This, of course, assumes clonal replication,
which holds only for very simple organisms.
In sexually reproducing populations, individuals inherit their genes from both parents.
Let us consider one gene locus where the alleles (that is, the diﬀerent types of genes)
A1, ..., AN can occur. An individual’s genotype is then described by the pair (Ai, Aj),
where the ﬁrst element denotes the allele inherited from the father and the second the
allele inherited from the mother. We denote the frequencies of the alleles in the population
by x1, ...xN , so that the state of the ‘gene pool’ is described by x ∈ SN . Usually, one
assumes that as a consequence of random mating, the population is in Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium; i.e. the frequency of the gene pair (Ai, Aj) is given by xixj. One also assumes
that the genotypes (Ai, Aj) and (Aj, Ai) lead to the same phenotype, i.e. that genes act
independently of whether they were transmitted maternally or paternally. If the ‘ﬁtness’
of genotype (Ai, Aj) (for instance, the survival rate of this genotype) is given by a constant
aij which is independent of the allelic frequencies xi, one obtains the replicator equation
(3) with a symmetric matrix A. This can be viewed as a partnership game played by the
alleles in the gene pool.
The case of frequency dependent selection leads to more complex game dynamics (see,
e.g., [MS81], [Es82], [Cr92], [Hi94], [HoSi98]). Let us assume that an individual with
genotype (Ai, Aj) uses a strategy p(ij) ∈ Sn for a population game described by the
n×n-matrix A (with p(ij) = p(ji)). The mean strategy p ∈ Sn in the population is given
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by
p = p(x) =
∑
ij
xixjp(ij). (69)
Since a given allele Ai belongs with probability xj to an (Ai, Aj)- or an (Aj, Ai)-individual,
the expression
pi =
∑
xjp(ij) =
1
2
∂p
∂xi
(70)
yields the frequencies of the strategies used by allele Ai. The usual ansatz then leads to
x˙i = xi[(p
i − p)TAp] (71)
on SN , which describes a frequency-dependent selection dynamics in the gene pool.
If the replicator equation (3) is a Shahshahani gradient, then so is (71) [Si87]. In
particular, if n = 2, i.e. if there are only two strategies, then the potential of (71) is given
by
V (x) =
α
2
[
∑
xixjp1(ij)−
a22 − a12
α
]2 (72)
provided α := a11 − a21 + a22 − a12 = 0. If the 2× 2-game admits a mixed ESS pˆ, i.e. if
a11 − a21 and a22 − a12 are both negative, then the strategy mix p converges to the ESS,
provided
S(pˆ) := {x ∈ SN : p(x) = pˆ} (73)
is non-empty.
Let us deﬁne the n× n matrix C(x) as the covariance matrix of the allelic strategies
pi, i.e.
ckl(x) =
∑
xi(p
i
k − pk)(p
i
l − pl). (74)
Then the frequencies p of the strategies in the population satisfy
p˙ = 2
∑
pix˙i = 2C(x)Ap. (75)
If at some x ∈ intSN one has p˙ = 0, then x˙ = 0. Thus if the strategy in the population
does not change, then the composition in the gene pool does not change.
The state pˆ ∈ Sn is said to be strategically stable if (a) S(pˆ) consists of rest points of
(71) and (b) for each neighborhood U of such an xˆ ∈ S(pˆ) there is a neighborhood V of
xˆ such that for all x ∈ V , one has x(t) ∈ U for all t > 0 and p(x(t)) → pˆ for t → +∞.
(Property (b) is weaker than asymptotic stability but stronger than stability.)
Theorem 15 ([CrHH96]) For n = 2 and n = 3, if pˆ is an ESS and S(pˆ) is non-empty,
then pˆ is strategically stable.
The proof makes heavy use of center manifold calculations. For n ≥ 4 the problem is still
open. However, one has the generic result
Theorem 16 ([Cr92], [HoS88], [HoSi98]) If pˆ ∈ intSn is an ESS, then it is strategi-
cally stable, provided that for all xˆ ∈ S(pˆ) the covariance matrix C(xˆ) has full rank (the
minimum of N − 1 and n− 1).
Several authors have studied the eﬀects of mutation and recombination on the long-term
evolution of strategies; see e.g. [Es96], [Ha96], [Wei96]. For other, fertility-based, models
at the interface of genetics and game theory, we refer to [HoSS82].
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4.2 Continua of strategies and adaptive dynamics
So far we have considered games with a ﬁnite number of pure strategies. In many cases,
one encounters games where the pure strategies belong to a continuum. This could be,
for instance, the size of an investment or the aspiration level of a player. In biology,
such strategies correspond to some continuously varying trait – the size of antlers, for
instance, the sex ratio in a litter or the virulence of an infection. A particularly interesting
application concerns the ‘war of attrition game’; see [MS82].
There exist several approaches to modelling the corresponding population dynamics.
We start by describing that of Bomze (see [Bo90], [Bo91]). The set of strategies is de-
scribed, not by {1, ..., n}, but by a possibly inﬁnite set S ⊂ Rn; a population corresponds
to a probability measure on the Borel subsets of S; the metric is given by the variational
norm on the Banach space of signed measures on S and the time-evolution t→ Q(t) of the
population obeys an ordinary diﬀerential equation in this Banach space which corresponds
to the replicator equation, namely
Q˙(A) =
∫
A
σ(x, Q)dQ (76)
for all Borel subsets A of S, where σ(x, Q) is the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ for using
strategy x ∈ S in a population Q and the average payoﬀ in populationQ. Under mild con-
ditions on the payoﬀ function, this dynamics is well deﬁned. Interestingly, strict NE need
not be stable; see [OR01]. But uninvadable populations are stable and weakly attracting
in the sense that those states which are close-by (in the variational norm) converge weakly
(i.e., in distribution). (P is uninvadable if there is an ǫ > 0 such that for all Q, the state P
does better than Q against all mixtures of (1−η)P +ηQ with η < ǫ. This ǫ plays the role
of a uniform invasion barrier; for games with inﬁnitely many strategies, it need not exist
for every ESS.) For interesting applications and extensions of this approach see [BoB95],
[OR01]. Stability results with respect to weak convergence are related to the CSS concept
discussed below; see [EsMS97] and [OR02]. Similar results are found by [HoOR03] for the
analog of the BNN dynamics.
Faced with a continuum of pure strategies, modellers frequently make up for the in-
creased size of the strategy space by simplifying the population structure. An example
is the adaptive dynamics approach, where it is assumed that the population is essentially
homogenous, all individuals sharing the same strategy or trait-value, with the exception of
an occasional, tiny minority adopting a strategy which is close to the prevailing strategy.
The basic question then is whether such dissidents can invade the resident population.
Recall that according to the intuition behind the concept of an ESS, an evolutionarily
stable strategy cannot be invaded.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case that the resident strategy is given by some real number
s and the invading strategy by s + h (with h small). The payoﬀ for an individual using
strategy s+ h in a population where almost all individuals use s is given by A(s+ h, s).
The invader succeeds if W (h, s) := A(s+h, s)−A(s, s) is positive. The adaptive dynamics
[HoS90] is given by the diﬀerential equation
s˙ =
∂W
∂h
(0, s). (77)
Depending on whether s˙ is positive or negative, this means that dissidents with a larger
(resp. smaller) s-value can invade. A strategy sˆ is a local strict Nash equilibrium if
W (h, sˆ) < 0 for all small h = 0. It is said to be convergence-stable if for all s = sˆ in
a neighborhood of sˆ, the diﬀerence W (h, s) has the sign of h(sˆ − s) for small h [Tay89],
23
[Es96], [Le90]. The point sˆ is a rest point of (77) if it is a local strict NE or convergence-
stable. Generically, a rest point sˆ is convergence-stable iﬀ ∂
2W
∂s∂h(sˆ) < 0, and a local strict
Nash equilibrium iﬀ ∂
2W
∂2h
(sˆ) < 0. Obviously, if the (homogenous) population is in a state
s close to a convergence-stable sˆ, then small deviations in the direction towards sˆ will suc-
ceed. Interestingly, the same need not hold if sˆ is a local strict Nash equilibrium, although
this is a local ESS. In this sense (as pointed out by [Es83], [No90], [TaKi91]), an ESS can
be unattainable (and ‘evolutionary stability’ therefore is a misnomer): there exist strate-
gies sˆ such that (a) if all members of the population adopt sˆ, dissidents cannot invade, but
(b) populations which are close-by will evolve away from sˆ. The corresponding states of
the population have been termed ‘Garden of Eden’-conﬁgurations. Conversely, there exist
states attracting near-by populations, but invasible by dissidents. States which are both
local strict NE and convergence-stable have been termed continuously stable strategies (or
CSS) by Eshel [Es83].
In the n-dimensional case, let us consider a population where all individuals share the
same strategy, given by an s in some open U ∈ Rn. A ‘mutant’ individual with trait
s + h would obtain an expected payoﬀ A(s+ h, s), and its relative advantage (compared
with the resident population) is W (h, s) := A(s + h, s)− A(s, s). In this case the vector
ﬁeld DhW (h, s), evaluated for h = 0, points in the direction of the maximal increase of
the advantage experienced by a potential mutant. If the vector does not vanish at the
point s, it deﬁnes a half-space with the property that a minority with strategy s + h
close to s will invade if and only if the strategy lies in that half-space. The corresponding
orbits of this vector ﬁeld oﬀer a rough approximation of the evolution of a homogenous
population by mutation and selection, where mutations are small and occur so rarely
that their fate (elimination, or else ﬁxation in the population) is settled before the next
mutation occurs [DiLa96], [Me96], [Ge02]. This adaptive dynamics has been intensively
used in mathematical models of the theory of evolution, including speciation, co-evolution,
etc.
In a more general setup, one can assume that genetic, developmental or other con-
straints render variation in some directions more likely than in others. This can be de-
scribed by a Riemannian metric on a submanifold S ⊆ Rn associating to each s ∈ S a
symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix G(s) such that the inner product in TsS, the tangent
space at s, is given by
[η, ξ]s = η
TG(s)ξ. (78)
The adaptive dynamics is then described by the vector ﬁeld s˙ satisfying
[η, s˙]s = DyA(y, s)(η) (79)
for all η in the tangent space at s, where the derivative is evaluated at y = s.
In particular, if the state space is intSn and A(y, x) is linear in y, i.e. of the form
yTa(x), one obtains
x˙i =
∑
cij(x)aj(x) (80)
where
C = G−1 − (gT1)−1ggT (81)
and g = G−11 (see [HoSi98]; the same equation has also been derived from a learning
model in [Hop99a]). In the special case of the Shahshahani metric, i.e. with gij(x) = δij
1
xi
,
where δ is the Kronecker delta, (80) yields the replicator equation (37).
Theorem 17 ([HoS90]) If xˆ ∈ intSn is a (local) ESS for a payoﬀ function A(y, x)
which is linear in y, then xˆ is asymptotically stable for each adaptive dynamics (80).
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Figure 4: The discrete time replicator dynamics (82) for the rock-scissors-paper game with
payoﬀ matrix A = (04− 2− 20413.75− 11.750) and c = 13.
Even in the one-dimensional case, this need not hold in the absence of the linearity as-
sumption; see [Me01].
4.3 Discrete time dynamics and ﬁctitious play
The equivalent of the replicator equation (3) in discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, ... is
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)
(Ax(t))i + c
x(t)TAx(t) + c
(82)
with some constant c whose task is to ensure that all numerators (and hence also the
denominator) are positive. This constant can be viewed as a ‘background payoﬀ’ and
accordingly the values aij as (positive or negative) increments in payoﬀ. The resulting
discrete dynamical system on Sn still satisﬁes the folk theorem (Nash equilibria are rest
points, etc.), but for n > 2 it can oﬀer more complex behaviour than the continuous
time dynamics. (Such deviations can be tuned down by increasing c). At least, (82) is a
diﬀeomorphism on Sn; see [LoA83]. For zero-sum games, interior equilibria are globally
repelling [AL84], and ESS need no longer be asymptotically stable. The discrete dynamics
of the rock-scissors-paper game is still simple in the case of cyclic symmetry [Ho84], but
in general it can exhibit attracting closed invariant curves in intS3, as shown in Figure 4
(see [Wei91]). Dominated strategies can survive under (82) (see [DeS92]) but are still
eliminated under the alternative discrete dynamics [CaS92]
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)
e(Ax)i∑
k xke
(Ax)k
(83)
which is occasionally better behaved than (82). For instance, if p is a unique NE in intSn,
and the ω-limit of x(t) is disjoint from bdSn, then the time average (x(1)+ · · ·+x(N ))/N
converges to p, just as in (11). The permanence condition (13) still implies permanence
of (83), but for (82) only for large c; see [GH03].
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Certain models of reinforcement learning lead to stochastic processes in discrete time
whose expected motion is closely related to the replicator equation; see [Bo¨S97], [Po97],
[ErR98], [Ru99], [Bo¨00], [LaTW01], [Hop02], [Beg02] and [HopP02].
A discrete-time equivalent of the best response dynamics is given by the ﬁctitious
play process of Brown and Robinson ([Br49], [Br51], [Ro51]). In a population setting
appropriate for evolutionary game dynamics, this could be viewed as a process where,
at every time step, a new player enters the population and adopts (once and for all) a
strategy which is a best reply to the current state x(t); see [Ho95a]. This yields
x(t+ 1) =
1
t+ 1
BR(x(t)) +
t
t+ 1
x(t). (84)
The original setting of the ﬁctitious play (FP) procedure of Brown [Br51] is that of an
asymmetric game played repeatedly by the two players, who both choose in each round a
best reply to the average of the strategies used by the co-player in the previous rounds.
Thus
pt+1 ∈ BR(Qt), qt+1 ∈ BR(Pt) (85)
with initial values p1 = P1 ∈ Sn, q1 = Q1 ∈ Sm and
Pt =
1
t
t∑
k=1
pk, Qt =
1
t
t∑
k=1
qk,
or equivalently
Pt+1 −Pt ∈
1
t+ 1
[BR(Qt)−Pt], Qt+1 −Qt ∈
1
t+ 1
[BR(Pt)−Qt]. (86)
The following result was conjectured in [Br51] and proved in [Ro51].
Theorem 18 For zero-sum games, any such sequence of mixed strategies (Pt,Qt) con-
verges to the set of equilibrium pairs (i.e. maximin solutions).
A modern proof runs as follows [Ho95a], [Har98], [HoSo02]: A ﬁctitious play path (86) is
an Euler discretization sequence with diminishing step sizes. The set of its limit points is
a (weakly) invariant set of the best response dynamics; i.e., it consists of complete orbits
of (55). Hence the global attractor of (55) contains all limit points of FP paths. For
zero-sum games, the global attractor is the set of NE; see section 3.3.
Fictitious play converges also for partnership games [MoSh96b], and for certain super-
modular games [Kr92].
The results on the smoothed best response dynamics can be applied to stochastic
ﬁctitious play [FL98] where (Pt,Qt) from (85), (86) describes a stochastic process, with
(perturbed) best replies chosen according to (59),
Prob(pt+1 = ei|Qt = y) = Ci(Ay). (87)
The expected increments are given by
E(Pt+1 −Pt|Qt = y) =
1
t+ 1
[C(Ay)− y], (88)
with a similar expression for the second player. Stochastic approximation theory [Ben99]
then allows us to derive convergence results for this stochastic process (see [HoSa02]),
which are analogous to results for the smoothed best response dynamics and extend pre-
vious results of [BenH99], [FL98] and others.
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Of course one can also study discrete time dynamics in the context of population genet-
ics – this is particularly appropriate for populations with disjoint generations. Equation
(82) with symmetric A (corresponding to a partnership game) is nothing but the classical
one-locus selection equation of population genetics. The average payoﬀ xTAx increases
along all orbits, and each orbit converges to a rest point. This equation describes the
scenario where each genotype has a ‘ﬁtness’, or survival probability, which is indepen-
dent of the composition of the population. If the genotype speciﬁes a strategy whose
success depends on the co-players’ behaviour, the resulting frequency-dependent selection
is much more complex. If there are only two strategies, however, with payoﬀs s1 and s2
depending on the frequencies of the N alleles in the gene pool, then (s1 − s2)
2 is a strict
Lyapunov function and the diﬀerence s1− s2 converges to 0 without changing sign ([Le84]
and [HoSi98]).
Similar discrete time dynamics can be studied for bimatrix games. For the cyclic 2×2-
game, for instance, the interior equilibrium is globally repelling for the analog of (82), but
for imitation dynamics where more than one individual is observed, attracting invariant
curves may surround the unstable equilibrium; see [HoSc00]. The following discrete time
version suggested in [Ho96] looks particularly interesting:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)
(Ay(t))i + c
x(t)TAy(t) + c
(89)
yj(t+ 1) = yj(t)
(BTx(t+ 1))j + d
y(t)TBTx(t+ 1) + d
. (90)
(Note the time t + 1 for the x in the second equation: the two players here alternate
their moves.) Such a map is still volume-preserving, and its eigenvalues are those of a
symplectic map; hence it shares the conservative properties of (21)-(22).
4.4 Diﬀusion models
Let us consider now populations of players distributed in a continuous space and described
by the spatial density p(x, t) ∈ Sn, where x denotes the space variable and the pi are the
frequencies of the strategies. If the local interaction among the players is described by
some dynamics p˙ = f(p), and the random motion of the players can be modelled by
diﬀusion, this yields a reaction-diﬀusion equation
∂p
∂t
= f(p) + d
∂2p
∂x2
. (91)
Here d > 0 is the diﬀusion constant, which for simplicity we assume to be independent of
the strategy i. (If this diﬀusion constant depends on the strategy, then one has to interpret
p(x, t) as the spatial density of the numbers – instead of the frequencies – of players at place
x at time t; see [Vi89], [HuVi92], [CrVi97]. In this case Turing instabilities may occur: NE
that are asymptotically stable under the reaction dynamics p˙ = f(p) may become unstable
in the reaction–diﬀusion dynamics. However, gratifyingly, an ESS cannot be destabilized
under the replicator dynamics with diﬀusion; see [Vi89], [CrVi97].)
Suppose now that space is the real line, and consider the bistable game A =
(a 0
0 b
)
with
a, b > 0. Then (91) reduces to a well-studied equation (see [Fi79])
∂p
∂t
= p(1− p)((a+ b)− bp) + d
∂2p
∂x2
. (92)
There exists a travelling wave p(x, t) = U(x − ct), where U : R → (0, 1) is strictly
increasing, with U(−∞) = 0, U(+∞) = 1, and the wave speed c is a− b, up to a positive
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factor. Hence, for a > b the strict equilibrium e1 with the higher payoﬀ a supersedes the
other equilibrium. Furthermore, e1 is spatially dominant in the following sense (see [Fi79]):
its basin of attraction contains an open set in the compact-open topology. If initially the
population is close to e1 on a suﬃciently large (but ﬁnite) interval, then it will converge
to e1 for all x.
This result for 2× 2 games is fairly independent of the speciﬁc reaction dynamics: it
also holds for BR, BNN, and some other adjustment dynamics. For systems of reaction-
diﬀusion equations, no general results on spatial dominance seem to be known. In partic-
ular, for (91) with n ≥ 3 strategies there are only few results, apart from the two obvious
facts that every game has at most one spatially dominant equilibrium and that many
games have no spatially dominant equilibrium.
Consider now a 2 × 2 bimatrix game, with payoﬀ matrices normalized to A =
(a1 0
0 b1
)
,
and B =
(a2 0
0 b2
)
, where ai, bi > 0. It has two strict NE, namely ei = (ei, fi) (i = 1, 2). The
following has been shown in [Ho97], [Ho99]:
Theorem 19 The equilibrium e1 is spatially dominant for the bimatrix version of (91)
with BR dynamics if
a1a2 > b1b2. (93)
Furthermore, there exists a unique monotone travelling wave that connects the two strict
NE. Its wave speed c is positive; i.e., e1 supersedes e2.
The condition (93) has been introduced by [HaSe88] as a criterion to select e1 over
e2 and is known as risk–dominance. There is a simple axiomatic characterization for it,
which is related to the fact that e1 has a larger basin of attraction than e2 under the best
response dynamics.
With the replicator dynamics as reaction term, the spatially dominant equilibrium is
– in contrast to (92) – not determined by a simple condition such as (93); see [HoHV97].
Most other results about spatial dominance concern N person games played between
N ≥ 3 distinct populations which are outside the scope of this survey. We mention only
unanimity games, which are a direct generalization of the bimatrix game above to N
players: If all players unanimously use the ﬁrst (second) strategy, player i gets payoﬀs
ai > 0 (resp. bi > 0). All other payoﬀs are 0. In analogy with (93), [HaSe88] postulated
N∏
i=1
ai >
N∏
i=1
bi (94)
as selection criterion for e1. [Ho99] shows that (94) indeed implies the spatial dominance
of e1. So far this seems to be, for N > 2, the only known evolutionary justiﬁcation of
Nash products as a selection criterion.
For related models and equilibrium selection results for discrete space (grids or net-
works as described below), see e.g. [Bl93], [El93], [Mor00], [Kos02].
4.5 Lattice-based populations
Another much studied approach to spatial games is based on a more detailed modelling
of the networks of interacting players. In the simplest case, players are assumed to be
located at the vertices of a given lattice. At each of the (discrete) time steps t, each
individual k engages in pairwise interactions with each of the co-players l from some
neighborhood N (k). Each game yields a payoﬀ P (k, l), and player k’s total payoﬀ is
P (k) :=
∑
l =k∈N(k) P (k, l). Then, players update their strategies through some imitation
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rule. For instance, player k could compare payoﬀs with all neighbors l ∈ N (k) (who, in
turn, have interacted within their neighborhoods N (l)) and adopt the strategy of that
player who did best (using a tie-breaking rule if the outcome is not uniquely speciﬁed).
Again, many variants are possible: in particular, the set of k’s potential role models could
be distinct from N (k), the imitation rule could be stochastic rather than deterministic,
the updating of the strategy could occur at diﬀerent moments for diﬀerent players, the
neighborhood lattice could evolve in time, etc. In addition to the strategic interaction and
the updating, which reﬂects some kind of selection of strategies, one could include migra-
tion, mutation, recombination and extinction phenomena. Depending on the details, the
resulting process describing the evolution of the distribution of strategies over the lattice
can be stochastic (see [BH87], [NoBoMay94], [Du99], [Kos02]) or result in a deterministic
cellular automaton, as in [NoMay92], [NoMay93]. Such spatial games have given rise to
few theorems, except for one-dimensional lattices (see [Bl93], [EsSS98], [Kos02]), but oﬀer
a promising ﬁeld for experimental mathematics suggesting many conjectures.
It may happen that strategies which are strictly dominated can resist elimination and
survive, for instance by freezing into clusters or by moving across the lattice in a kind of
spatio-temporal chaos; see [NoMay92]. More generally, the neighborhood structure usually
tends to favor the long-term co-existence of strategies which would not co-exist in well-
mixed populations. Speciﬁc initial conditions can reproduce in neighboring locations and
travel like ‘gliders’ across the lattice. Often, almost all initial conditions seem to lead to
the same overall average frequency [NoMay92]. The relationship between the evolution of
the strategies on the lattice and the corresponding mean ﬁeld dynamics, e.g. the replicator
equation applied to the spatial averages of the strategies’ frequencies, oﬀers a tantalising
ﬁeld of open problems [Du99].
4.6 Finite populations
In ﬁnite populations of size N , some of the concepts of evolutionary game dynamics must
be modiﬁed. In particular, the relevance of interior ESS has been debated (cf. [MS88],
[S88] and the literature therein). Invasion barriers below 1/N make little sense; and since
the frequencies change in ﬁnite steps, it may happen that if a player switches towards
a better strategy, this strategy ceases to be better. Schaﬀer’s [S88] reformulation of the
ESS concept for a ‘playing the ﬁeld’ situation with N players is a useful framework for
economic applications; see [S89], [AF01] and [AF02]. The stability of mixed NE in a
random matching-like setting is studied in [Oe97] and [AF00].
For ﬁnite populations, stochastic models often seem more realistic than deterministic
ones. The paper by Foster and Young [FoYo90], who simply added white noise to the
replicator equation, inspired a whole literature of stochastic models, all using and adapt-
ing large deviation techniques from [FrW84], each postulating diﬀerent behavior at the
individual level. Young [Y93], [Y98] considers a truncated stochastic variant of ﬁctitious
play. Another model [KaMR93] incorporates Darwinian ideas (i.e., successful strategies
spread) via an imitation process where agents copy the most successful strategies, whereas
[KaR95] considers myopic best reply. This makes a diﬀerence; see [Sa98]. Here the pop-
ulation is assumed to be ﬁnite, and in each period, one or several players can adjust by
imitating the best or choosing a best reply to the current state. In addition, random per-
turbations occurring with a small probability ε can alter the strategy of every player. This
deﬁnes a Markov process describing the number of players using each strategy, i = 1, ..., n.
The random perturbations guarantee that the process is irreducible and hence admits a
unique stationary distribution. The limit of this distribution, for ε → 0, is a well deﬁned
distribution which approximates the time average spent in the diﬀerent states. The sup-
29
port of this distribution is said to be the set of long run equilibria. This set can be a cycle,
but for important classes of games, it consists of a single NE.
For 2×2 coordination games most of these models select the risk dominant equilibrium,
but see [Sa97] (a summary of contributions by Samuelson and co-workers on this topic) and
[V96] for interesting exceptions. For larger games also, the diﬀerences between the ‘long
run equilibrium’ of [KaR95] and the ‘stochastically stable equilibrium’ of [Y93] become
pronounced; see [JJS99].
This approach has led to many important economic applications, such as oligop-
olies [V97], [RS01], [AFS00], signalling games [NS97], and insurance markets
[ATW02], to mention a few.
Finite population models in the form of Markov chains also provide microfounda-
tions for many of the diﬀerential equations considered in sections 2 and 3; see [BenW00],
[HoSa01], [Sch01] for rigorous results connecting the large population limit with the asymp-
totic behavior of the diﬀerential equations. This branch of stochastic approximation theory
relies heavily on the study of invariant measures.
4.7 Applications
In this expository paper, we aim at stressing the variety of plausible dynamics which de-
scribe adaptive mechanisms underlying game theory. The replicator equation describes
just one of many dynamics. For some models of evolutionary game theory, it does not
suﬃce to specify the strategies and the payoﬀ values; one must also be explicit about the
transmission mechanisms describing how strategies spread within a population. If strate-
gies spread through inheritance, this is straightforward (although we are presently still far
from a complete understanding of how a given behavioural trait is related to the genome).
Most interesting examples of strategies spread through learning, but again, the details
of such a process are likely to be considerably more complex than the rules imitate the
better or proportional imitation. As for the best reply and related dynamics, they probably
demand more cognitive capabilities than most individuals can muster. Fortunately, for
many games, most dynamics lead to the same predictions.
We do not try to describe the wealth of possible applications of evolutionary game
theory; all we attempt here is to give some signposts to the huge relevant literature.
The ﬁrst applications of, and indeed the motivation for, evolutionary game theory
are found in evolutionary biology, where by now thousands of papers have proved the
fruitfulness of the approach (we refer to [DR98] for a collection of survey papers, and
[Si93] for a popularized account). In fact, questions of sex-ratio, and more generally of
sex-allocation, even antedate any explicit formulation of evolutionary game theory. It was
R.F. Fisher who used frequency-dependent selection to explain the prevalence of a 1:1
sex ratio [Fi30], and W.D. Hamilton who extended this type of thinking to make sense
of other, odd sex ratios [H67]. Maynard Smith coined his concept of ESS to explain the
prevalence of ritual ﬁghting in intraspeciﬁc animal contests [MS74]. The subtleties of such
contests are still a favorite topic among the students of animal behaviour. More muted,
but certainly not less widespread, conﬂicts arise on the issue of mate choice, parental
investment, and parent-oﬀspring conﬂicts (see e.g. [Tr74], [Go95], [MoPa97]). Social
foraging is another ﬁeld where the success of a given behaviour (scrounging, for instance)
depends on its prevalence; so are dispersal and habitat selection. Communication (alarm
calls, threat displays, sexual advertisement, gossip) with its possibilities of deceit is replete
with game theoretical problems concerning bluﬀ and honest signalling. Predators and their
prey or parasites and their hosts oﬀer examples of games between two populations, with
the success of a trait depending on the state of the other population. Some strategic
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interactions are surprisingly sophisticated, considering the lowly level of the players: for
instance, bacteria poisoning their neighbors or lizards attempting sneaky matings are
engaged in rock-scissors-paper games [K02], [SL96].
Quite a few of these games turned out to have the same structure as games that
had been studied by economists, usually under another name: the biologists’ ‘Hawk and
Dove’ and ‘Battle of the Sexes’ have the same structure as the economists’ ‘Chicken’, resp.
‘Buyer-Seller’ game. A common language is slow in emerging, but by now hundreds of
papers in economic theory use concepts from evolutionary games.
One zone of convergence for studies of animal behaviour and human societies is that
of cooperation. Indeed, the theory of evolution and economic theory each have their own
paradigm of selﬁshness, encapsulated in the slogans of the ‘selﬁsh gene’ and the ‘homo
economicus’, and both conﬂicting with widespread evidence of ultra-social behaviour. In
ant and bee societies, the relatedness of individuals is so close that their genetic interests
overlap and their communities can be viewed as ‘superorganisms’. But in human soci-
eties, close cooperation can also occur between individuals who are unrelated. In many
cases, such cooperation is based on reciprocation. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is the
archetypical model displaying the conﬂict between selﬁshness and public good. It is a
2 × 2 game with two strategies – to cooperate or to defect. The latter is the dominating
strategy, but the payoﬀ, if both players defect, is less than the payoﬀ if both cooperate.
The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is used to analyse reciprocating interactions [A84]. It
admits a wealth of strategies but no strict equilibrium and no ESS [FaW89]. It has been
investigated by extensive computer simulations of evolutionary game dynamics; see e.g.
[NoS93]. The reciprocating strategy Tit for Tat and the unconditional strategy Always
Defect are in bistable equilibrium and give rise to deep problems in coordination. The
threat of punishment is another very eﬃcient reason for the prevalence of cooperation
[FG00]. Again, it leads to bistable equilibria, corresponding to behavioural norms; which
of these norms eventually emerges depends on the history of the population [Sk01].
Animal behaviour and experimental economics fuse in this area. Experimental eco-
nomics has greatly ﬂourished in the last few years [KR95]: it often uses very simple games
which can be analysed by means of evolutionary dynamics. Public goods games, for in-
stance, with and without options of punishing the co-players for not contributing, lead to
interesting two-stage games [SHN01]. These are closely related to the Ultimatum game,
where two players have to agree – without any opportunity of haggling – on how to split
a sum oﬀered by the experimenter or else forfeit that sum [GBS95], [NPS00]. These and
other games display the limitations of ‘rational’ behaviour in humans [HB01]. Evolution-
ary game theory is not tied down by this assumption and hence allows us to suggest other
explanations for ‘irrational’ solidarity and fairness.
4.8 The recurrence of ‘Brownian’ motion
The success of the replicator dynamics in the 1980’s was due to its roots in evolutionary
theory and ‘population thinking’, but the subsequent development has helped, interest-
ingly, to re-appraise ideas from the (ﬁrst) golden age of game theory, at the turn of the
1950s, as shown in [Ho00]. Two clusters of ideas stand out. One centers around the two
dynamics introduced by G.W. Brown – one the ‘ﬁctitious play’ approach leading to the
BR-dynamics (51), the other the BNN dynamics (65). In fact, if f : R+ −→ R+ is a
continuous function satisfying f(0) = 0 and f(s) > 0 for s > 0, and if ki(x) is given by
(66), then
x˙i = f(ki)− xi
∑
j
f(kj) (95)
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is a common generalisation, as can be seen by using f(s) = sα with α > 0. Indeed, for
α = 1 one recovers the BNN dynamics and for α → +∞ (after renormalisation) the BR
dynamics. Interior ESS are globally asymptotically stable for (95). The same holds for
the smoothed BR dynamics, as we have seen in section 3.4.
Intriguingly, the three proofs oﬀered by John Nash for his equilibrium theorem (see
[Na01]) are all related to a dynamic. These three proofs are based, respectively, on (a)
the multivalued map x→ BR(x), and hence the BR-dynamics, (b) on the perturbed BR
maps
x →
max(0, (Ax)i−maxk(Ax)k + ε)∑
j max(0, (Ax)j −maxk(Ax)k + ε)
(96)
and (c) on x → f(x) with f given by (67). On the other hand, our own proof in section
2.3 is based on the replicator dynamics.
Far from being a recent oﬀshoot, evolutionary game dynamics is rooted ﬁrmly in the
origins of game theory.
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